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Introduction
The use of confidential sources by journalists has always been a matter of controversy. During the past several decades, the press has sought
the right to maintain the confidentiality of its sources even in the face of
subpoenas commanding disclosure. Normally such subpoenas arise
when the press has published information that was received from a confidential source and is relevant to some criminal investigation conducted
by the state. In Branzburg v. Hayes,' for instance, several reporters
sought constitutional immunity from complying with a grand jury subpoena requiring testimony concerning information obtained from confidential sources.2
As in Branzburg, the press has continued to argue for the right to
maintain the confidentiality of its sources on the grounds that without
such a right its news sources would eventually disappear. 3 However, this
issue of confidentiality took a significant turn recently when the United
States Supreme Court decided Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.4
In Cohen, the press switched its position on confidentiality of
sources and argued that the First Amendment confers the freedom to
reveal source identities even when the press promises anonymity to those
sources.5 This argument presented somewhat of a contradiction to the
argument made in Branzburg. In that case, the press argued that only a
constitutionally protected confidence would ensure that sources wishing
to remain anonymous would come forward with important information.6
The Supreme Court in Cohen, however, rejected the press' arguments
and hence continued a recent trend of judicial decisions unfavorable to
the press.7
This article examines the Court's decision in Cohen, particularly
analyzing the view of the First Amendment expressed in the majority
decision. This view, the "interest-group" view, was first articulated by
the press in cases like Branzburg where it was used to argue for protected
confidentiality of sources. Unfortunately, this view backfired in Cohen
and led to a decision that ran contrary to the interests of the press.
1. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).

2. Id. at 667. Branzburg was the first Supreme Court decision on confidential sources
and First Amendment protections.
3. Id. at 671 n.5.

4. 111 S.Ct. 2513 (1991).
5. Id. at 2517.
6. 408 U.S. at 671 n.5.

7. See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991); Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990); Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978); Zurcher v.
Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978).
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After discussing the pitfalls of an interest-group view of the First
Amendment, this article proposes that the courts take a particular functional view when deciding Press Clause disputes. The proposed functional view rests heavily upon an interpretation of the Press Clause as a
protection of the flow of information in society. Thus, the press is protected when it fulfills its role as information supplier and communication
facilitator. Under this view, the treatment and use of confidential sources
by the press is scrutinized. The critical inquiry is whether the use of such
sources furthers or contradicts the constitutional role and function of a
free press.
I
The Cohen Decision in an Era of Press Unpopularity
During the last several years, public respect for the media has fallen,
even in relation to other institutions in society.8 For instance, when the
media complained that the Reagan Administration had prevented it from
covering the Grenada invasion, most Americans sided with the government and believed that the media would not just report the invasion but
try to sabotage it.9 Furthermore, during the Gulf War, the public saw
the press as antagonistic to the nation's military aims. These reactions,
along with the increasing number of libel suits and size of punitive damages awards against the press, reflect a growing mistrust of the press.10
This public suspicion and distrust of the press has recently been the
subject of intense analysis. Studies of recent libel suits reveal the libel
explosion as one of America's newest growth industries.II These studies
recognize the great sympathy of modern juries for libel plaintiffs and imply that this may be the result of the underlying public distrust of the
press. Indeed, the large libel awards demonstrate that the ordinary citizens who make up juries feel estranged from and suspicious toward the
press. 12
Public hostility to the press has also been expressed in terms of criticisms of media monopolization.' 3 This criticism stems from the alleged
8. S. Robert Lichter & Stanley Rothman, Media and Business Elites, PUB. OPINION,
Oct.-Nov. 1981, at 42.
9. THOMAS R. DYE, WHO'S RUNNING AMERICA? 112 (4th ed. 1986).
10. FREEDOM AND FAIRNESS: REGULATING THE MASS MEDIA, 89 REPORT FROM THE
CENTER FOR PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC POLICY (Fall 1986).
11. RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SUING THE PRESS: LIBEL, THE MEDIA AND POWER 89 (1986).

The unpopularity of the press and the rash of recent libel suits are also discussed in RICHARD
CLURMAN, BEYOND MALICE: THE MEDIA'S YEARS OF RECKONING (1988).
12. PETER STOLER, THE WAR AGAINST THE PRESS: POLITICS, PRESSURE AND INTIMIDATION IN THE 80's 94 (1986).
13. BENJAMIN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY (2d ed. 1987).

HASTINGS CoMM/ENT L.J.

[Vol. 14:403

adverse effects of chain-owned newspapers on the communities they
serve and argues that the modem monopolized press does not respond to
the interests of local audiences. 4
The current unpopularity of the media has probably helped contribute to a series of setbacks for the press in the courts. Indeed, the public
backlash against the press has been most evident in the judicial system.
Citizen juries have been quite harsh on press defendants in libel lawsuits,
and their verdicts have reflected those harsh judgments. In fact, because
of this public hostility and distrust, much First Amendment press law
currently arises from the relationship between the press and the public' 5
rather than from the relationship between the press and the government,
as was the case in the 1950s and 1960s. 16
The constitutional protections granted to the press in the 1960s and
1970s have eroded in the judicial decisions of the last several years. For
instance, in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 7 the Court ruled that certain expressions of opinions could be subject to a libel action.I s The
Court in Milkovich found that a newspaper columnist's statements implied that the plaintiff had perjured himself in judicial proceedings and
hence did not qualify as constitutionally protected opinion. 19 And in
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,20 an altered quotation was found actionable under a cause of action for libel."' While neither of these cases
presented a direct assault on the libel doctrine established in New York
Times v. Sullivan, they did present novel challenges to certain aspects of
traditional constitutional protections from libel actions accorded to the
press. Yet perhaps the most novel of such recent attacks on the press
occurred in Cohen v. Cowles Media Co.22
In Cohen, the Supreme Court found the media defendants liable for
publishing the identity of an informant who had been promised anonymity by reporters employed by the defendants. 23 At trial, the testimony
revealed that during the 1982 Minnesota gubernatorial campaign, Dan
Cohen, who was associated with one party's campaign, provided to re14. Id.
15.

See PATRICK GARRY, THE AMERICAN VISION OF A FREE PRESS xi (1990).

16. See generally New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Communist
Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Dennis v. United States, 341

U.S. 494 (1951).
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

110 S. Ct. 2695 (1990).
Id. at 2705.
Id. at 2707.
111 S. Ct. 2419 (1991).
Id. at 2431.
111 S.Ct. 2513 (1991).
Id. at 2520.
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porters from the St. PaulPioneerPressDispatch and the Minneapolis Star
and Tribune documents regarding criminal charges against the other
party's candidate for Lieutenant Governor. Cohen furnished these
records on the condition that his identity would not be disclosed as the
source of the information.24 After receiving the records and consulting
with the reporters, the editorial staffs of the two newspapers independently decided to publish Cohen's name as part of their stories concerning the criminal charges against the candidate for Lieutenant
Governor.2 5 The editors felt that the identity of the source was highly
newsworthy, since it suggested a smear campaign.2 6 As a result of this
publication, Cohen was fired by his employer and subsequently sued the
publishers of the two newspapers in a breach of contract action.27
The trial court rejected the newspapers' argument that the First
Amendment barred Cohen's lawsuit. A jury returned a verdict in Cohen's favor and awarded him $200,000 in compensatory damages and
$500,000 in punitive damages. 28 However, the Minnesota Supreme
Court overturned the judgment as a violation of the defendants' First
Amendment rights.29 This decision, in turn, was reversed on appeal to
the United States Supreme Court, which held that the First Amendment
gives the press no special protection from any breach of contract or
promissory estoppel actions of the type alleged by Cohen.3 °
The majority opinion written by Justice White relied on the neutrality doctrine. Under this doctrine, the press receives no special constitutional protection from general laws applicable to the public at large.
According to the neutrality doctrine, such laws "do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has incidental effects on its ability to gather and report the news."'" As the
Court stated, "Enforcement of such general laws against the press is not
subject to stricter scrutiny than would be applied to enforcement against
other persons or organizations." 32 Thus, under the neutrality doctrine,
courts will generally apply laws that are not specifically aimed at the
press equally to both the press and the general public. For instance, the
press, like the rest of society, must obey grand jury subpoenas,33 must not
24. Id. at 2516.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 457 N.W.2d 199, 202 (Minn. 1990), rev'd, 111 S. Ct.
2513 (1991).
30. Cohen, 111 S. Ct. at 2518.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667 (1972).
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violate the antitrust laws, 34 must comply with the labor laws,35 and must

pay general sales taxes that do not discriminate against the press.36
The majority in Cohen declared that "the publisher of a newspaper
has no special immunity from the application of general laws [and] has
no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of others."' 37 Furthermore, the majority found that the doctrines of breach of contract and
promissory estoppel under which Cohen had sued were laws of general
applicability.3 8 Consequently, the Court had little difficulty in applying
the neutrality doctrine and concluding that "the First Amendment does
not confer on the press a constitutional right to disregard promises that
would otherwise be enforced under state law.", 39 Since any other individual or business would be liable for a broken contract or promise, so too
are the respondent newspapers.
The respondents in Cohen occupied a difficult position. For years,
the press has argued for constitutional protection of confidential sources.
Yet in Cohen, the newspapers were essentially arguing that they ought to
be free to ignore a promise of confidentiality when the newsworthiness of
the source so warranted. To many observers, the press was advocating a
one-sided rule regarding confidentiality: it could not be forced to divulge
the identity of a source, but it could voluntarily do so, even in violation
of a promise to the contrary. Moreover, different members of the press
had different and contradictory reactions to the ruling in Cohen. While
reporters praised the decision, editors and publishers decried it. This division was particularly noted by media commentators, who depicted the
case as involving a battle of rights and power among editors, reporters,
and informants.'
Given the deliberate breach of promise and even the general support
of newspaper reporters for a rule upholding that promise, the Supreme
Court's decision in Cohen appears on its face to be a logical and necessary decision. If the rest of the American public is liable for the breach
of contracts they make, why should the press be free to breach its contracts? The decision is also consistent with the public's desire to impose
some accountability upon the press. However, perhaps the most remark34. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 7 (1945).
35. Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103, 128 (1937).
36. Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,

581 (1983).
37. 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2518 (1991) (quoting Associated Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. at 132-33
(1937)).
38. Id.

39. Id. at 2519.
40. See Theodore L. Glasser, Protecting the Reporter at the Editor's Expense, MEDIA
ETHICS UPDATE 4 (Fall 1988); Phillip J. Tichenor, There are Two Winners in Cohen Case,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR AND TRIBUNE, July 7, 1991, at A1S.
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able and the most troubling impact of the decision lies in the majority's
view of the First Amendment Press Clause. Indeed, the Court in its decision interpreted the Free Press Clause in a way that keeps valuable and
truthful information from the public.
II
The Interest-Group View of the First Amendment in
Cohen
Although the Court used the neutrality doctrine to explain its decision, it arrived at the decision through the application of an interestgroup rights view of the First Amendment Press Clause. According to
this view, the First Amendment parcels out various rights to various actors within the media network. The outcome, and the eventual First
Amendment doctrines, are the result of the conflicts between the rights
and demands of the various actors. However, as illustrated by Cohen, the
resulting doctrines are not necessarily supportive of the goals and purposes of the First Amendment and a free press.
At issue in Cohen were the rights of three distinct groups: editors,
reporters, and informants. Editors sought to retain the right to make the
final decision on what information to publish; reporters sought the right
to bind their editors to obey any promises the reporters make in the
course of obtaining information; informants sought the right to control
the use of the information they provide to the press. To decide the dispute, the Court weighed the interests of these various actors and held in
favor of the reporters and informants.4 1 This actor-based or interestgroup approach to the First Amendment, however, ignored both the
public interest and the role of a free press in democracy. For instance, in
Cohen, the Court's ruling sanctioned the withholding of important information from the public (i.e., evidence of a smear campaign) and consequently frustrated the public's ability to make informed and reasoned
political choices. Thus, while the Court's decision may have forced the
press to treat its informants fairly, it ignored both the press' responsibility to the public and the public's interest in obtaining political truth.
An interest-group approach to the First Amendment, as used in Cohen, contains the same problems as does interest-group politics.4 2 The
latter has been thoroughly criticized as contributing to the decline of
41. Justice Blackmun's dissent criticized this interest-group approach and favored the approach taken by the Minnesota Supreme Court. That court's decision, according to Blackmun, was "premised not on the identity of the speaker, but on the speech itself." 111 S. Ct. at
2520.
42. The problems and development of interest group politics are discussed in THEODORE
J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: IDEOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE CRISIS OF PUBLIC Au-
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democratic politics in the last several decades. According to its critics,
interest-group politics dole out rights and entitlements to various constituent groups without regard for the larger public interest.4 a Democracy
consequently becomes a collection of competing groups rather than a nation of equal individual citizens with certain common interests. Public
policy is made not according to the public interest but according to the
demands of various interest groups involved in the political process." In
the same way, an interest-group approach to the First Amendment looks
simply to the rights and interests of the various actors associated with
"the press." As with interest-group politics, however, an interest-group
approach to the First Amendment ignores the broader picture, i.e., the
public interest and the role of the press in a democracy. Consequently,
First Amendment doctrines evolve from an allocation of rights to those
involved in the media network, but without sufficient consideration of the
broad, functional purpose of a free press.
The interest-group view of the First Amendment began to take
shape at about the same time interest-group politics took hold-in the
1970s. In arguing for press freedoms, First Amendment theorists
adopted a "fourth estate" theory of the press.4" Justice Stewart, perhaps
the most prominent of the fourth estate advocates, argued that the primary purpose of the Free Press Clause is to create a separate fourth estate outside the government to serve as an additional check on the three
official branches." Consequently, to create such a press, fourth estatists
argued that the institutional press should have special rights and powers.4 7 Thus, fulfilling the mandate of the First Amendment meant conferring additional powers on particular press outlets. Consequently, the
First Amendment, under the fourth estate theory, protects specific press
institutions and actors regardless of their specific information activities.
THORITY (1st ed. 1969) and in ALONZO L. HAMBY, LIBERALISM AND ITS CHALLENGERS:
FDR TO REAGAN (1985).
43. PATRICK M. GARRY, LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN IDENTITY 165 (1992).
44. HAMBY, supra note 42, at 344.
45. See Randall P. Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977);
Margaret A. Blanchard, The InstitutionalPress and Its First Amendment Privileges, 1978 Sup.
CT. REV. 225; Melville B. Nimmer, Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does It Add
to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1975); see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S.
665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting)("The press plays a governmental role insofar as it is
the arbiter and advocate of the public's interest in government.").
46. See Potter Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 634 (1975); see also Vincent

Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 521
(1977).
47. In addition to Justice Stewart, Justice Douglas also expressed this fourth estate view
in Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 722 (1972). Professor Blasi has also been a forceful advocate of this view. See Blasi, supra note 46, at 527.
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The fourth estate theory took an interest-group view of the First
Amendment Press Clause: whatever made certain press groups stronger
in turn furthered the constitutional free press values.4 8 This interestgroup approach focused not on the role or purpose of the press under the
Free Press Clause of the First Amendment, but on the powers of specific
entities qualifying as "the press." It parcelled out the press as distinct
interest groups within First Amendment adjudication. Just as particular
groups were singled out in interest-group politics with a presumption
that their sought-after programs constituted public policy in the best interests of their members and of society as a whole, the fourth estate theory presumed that whatever made particular press actors stronger also
furthered the goals of a free press in a democratic society.4 9
The fourth estate view was first proposed as a functional approach
to the First Amendment Press Clause. By protecting the power of the
established press to investigate government, the "watchdog" function of
the press would be served.5 ° To enable the press to serve such a function,
fourth estatists argued that the press should have special rights of access
and protection to gather news that were not possessed by the general
public. 5 Thus, in the fourth estate model, a free press was a privileged
and powerful press.
This functional aspect of the fourth estate model differs significantly
from the functional approach outlined below. 2 Essentially, the fourth
estate model served only to strengthen the existing media entities under
the assumption that the additional powers would enhance the watchdog
function, which would then servethe process of self-government. It was
a third-hand functional approach. Although enhancing the power of certain interest groups within the media, i.e., the investigative power of publishers and editors, the fourth estate model did nothing to assure that the
new power would actually better fulfill the constitutional function of the
Free Press Clause as outlined below.53 Under the fourth estate model,
only particular functions of certain press entities are protected, not the
functioning of the role of a free press in a democratic society.
As a prelude to Cohen, the fourth estate view was initially advocated
by the Supreme Court in cases involving the special rights of press entities to gather information. One of these rights involved the confidential48. Stewart, supra note 45, at 631.
49. See Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press: A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV.
L. REV. 1641, 1658 (1967); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 390-91 (1974) (White,
J., dissenting).
50. Justice Douglas also advocated this view in Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 722.
51. Blasi, supra note 46, at 527.
52. See infra Part III.
53. See Barron, supra note 49, at 1658.
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ity of informants. In Branzburg, the press sought the right, under the
fourth estate theory, to maintain the confidentiality of its sources.5 4 In
stark contrast to the press claims later made in Cohen, advocates of this
confidentiality privilege argued that the absence of such a privilege would
dangerously weaken press organizations in the newsgathering process. 5
Just as interest-group politics has come under heavy criticism, so
too has the fourth estate view of the First Amendment.5 6 Critics claim
that under this view the press has ceased to serve as a social forum for
communication and has crowded out the public from the communication
process. Furthermore, it has become evident that protection of press entities has not translated into an expansion of social and political communication; instead, the growing power and aloofness of press organizations
have often soured the public to First Amendment protections. 57 Professor Barron, for instance, has argued that it is a mistake to identify "the
press" with "the people" and to think that immunity from suit for newspapers is equivalent to enhancing the right of free expression for all mem58
bers of the community.
The fourth estate model takes an interest-group approach because it
essentially focuses on protecting the existing actors in the industry. The
fourth estate model also fails to consider the public's interest or participation in an open communication forum. In fact, as a fourth estate, the
press becomes much more than a conduit for the news and achieves such
54. 408 U.S. 665, 681 (1972). Branzburg involved a reporter who had covered activities of
criminal suspects and who had been subpoenaed by a grand jury to testify concerning informa-

tion obtained in confidence in the course of newsgathering activities. Justice White's opinion
conceded that "without some protection for seeking out the news, freedom of the press could
be eviscerated." Id. The fourth estate view was also asserted in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 821 (1974) and in Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 845 (1974), in which the
litigants argued that they should be able to obtain access to state and federal prisons, an access
not available to the public. It was not, however, until Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,
448 U.S. 555 (1980), that the Court expressly invoked the right to gather information when it
held that the First Amendment guarantees the right of the press to attend criminal trials. Id.
at 576.
55. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 32 n.22 (1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting). And,
according to Professor Nimmer, it is only because the absence of such a media privilege would
deter the ability to gather information that the privilege itself has a constitutional base. MELVILLE B. NIMMER, FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.09[c], at 4-58, 4-59 (1984).
56. A powerful example of the public reaction against interest-group politics occurred
during the unsuccessful 1984 presidential campaign of Walter Mondale, who was seen as a
candidate captive to special interests. Criticisms of the fourth estate theory can be found in
William W. Van Alystyne, The First Amendment and the Free Press, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1
(1980); Barron, supra note 49, at 1658; and in Justice White's opinions in Herbert v. Lando,
441 U.S. 153 (1979); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978); and Branzburg v. Hayes,
408 U.S. 665 (1972).
57. See Robert Meister, JournalisticSilence and Governmental Speech: Can Institutions
Have Rights? 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 319, 323 (1981).
58. Barron, supra note 49, at 1658.
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power in itself that it becomes the focus of the news. Indeed, over the
last several decades, the power and practices of the news media have
become a substantial part of the news, as they have in Cohen.
The dangers of the fourth estate model were revealed in Cohen. In
taking an interest-group approach to the First Amendment, the Court's
analysis was limited to the participants in the press process. The Court
did not consider the function or purpose of a free press. Rather than
seeing the press as a constitutionally protected function, the Court saw it
as a collection of private rights.5 9

III
A Proposed Functional Approach to Press Cases
Contrary to the Cohen approach, a functional approach would address the rights of the participants in the press process-the editors, reporters, and informants--only insofar as those participants served the
democratic and constitutional functions of the press. Instead of viewing
the First Amendment as a parcelling of private rights to the groups involved in the media network, a functional approach would protect the
vital role and purpose of the press in a democratic society.
A functional approach to press cases examines disputes in relation
to the constitutional function and purpose of a free press under the First
Amendment. This constitutes the primary difference between the Speech
and Press Clauses of the First Amendment. While the former protects
individuals and entities in their acts of expression, the latter protects the
social and political functions of a free press in a democratic society.'
Thus, with a functional approach, the Court in Cohen would have asked
whether the enforcement of the promise of confidentiality would have
furthered the purpose and values of a free press, and not simply focused
on which rights of which press participants to favor.
In the American constitutional tradition, a free press serves two primary functions: to assist the spread of truth in society, and to support a
democratic society in the process of self-government through the creation
of an open and uncensored marketplace of ideas.6" Given these functions, controversies under the Press Clause of the First Amendment
59. As argued by Justice Souter in his dissent, "The First Amendment goes beyond protection of the press and the self-expression of individuals to prohibit government from limiting
the stock of information from which members of the public may draw." Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2532 (1991).
60. For a discussion of this distinction, see PATRICK M. GARRY, THE AMERICAN VISION
OF A FREE PRESS 69-107 (1990).

61. This illustrates another difference from the fourth estate model, which sees a free press
as serving a "watchdog" or "checking" function in relation to government.
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should be resolved in a manner that will fulfill the truth and self-government values of a free press.
The truth value has a firm foundation in constitutional history. Proponents of free expression at the time of the ratification of the Bill of
Rights believed that the value of uninhibited expression lay in the discovery of truth.6 2 Modern First Amendment scholars have continued to articulate the truth function of free speech and press.6 3 According to
Alexander Meiklejohn, the framers enacted the constitutional protection
of the press to ensure the dissemination of political truth.4
The truth value underlying the First Amendment initially found its
expression in constitutional law through the marketplace of ideas metaphor employed by Mr. Justice Holmes in his dissent in Abrams v. United
States.6 5 The subsequent proponents of the marketplace metaphor and
truth value theories have consistently supported the expansion of First
Amendment protections.6 6 According to these proponents, the constitutional foundation of the First Amendment rests upon a belief that a free
press must be protected as a mechanism through which society can determine truth.
A second function or purpose of a free press is the maintenance of a
system of self-government. Citizens in a democratic society must have a
forum in which to communicate openly and freely so that they may then
engage in meaningful self-government. Social communication constitutes a vital requisite for political action. Hence, this democratic dialogue function forms an important purpose of a free press.6" Indeed, one
principle of First Amendment interpretation that is widely supported
holds that a primary purpose of the amendment is to sustain the process
of representative self-government that is so clearly created in the constitutional scheme.6" The Supreme Court has stated that the First Amend62. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 717 (1931) (citing 1 J. OF THE CONTINENTAL
CONG. 104, 108 (1904 ed.)).

63. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 26-27 (1972); ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 31
(1941).
64. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 63, at 26-27, 88-89; see also Alexander Meiklejohn, The
FirstAmendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245.
65. 250 U.S. 616 (1919). Holmes stated that "the best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market." Id. at 630 (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
66. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), in which the Court stated
that the purpose of a free press was to assure "the widest possible dissemination of information
from diverse ... sources ....
Id. at 20. The Court later stated in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), that "[i]t is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which the truth will ultimately prevail." Id. at 390.
67. See Nimmer, supra note 45, at 653.
68. See Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966).
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ment "prohibits the state from interfering with the communicative
processes through which its citizens exercise and prepare to exercise their
rights of self-government." 6 9 In other words, an open and healthy democracy, as supported by the self-government function of the First
Amendment, requires an equally open marketplace of ideas created by a
free press.
Adopting a functional view of the Press Clause requires courts to
consider the purposes of a free press while examining constitutional
claims under the Press Clause; i.e., courts must seek the protection of
whatever functions are essential for a free press. By taking an interestgroup approach, the majority in Cohen ignored the two principal functions of a free press: the attainment of truth and the support of selfgovernment. The decision not only sanctioned the withholding of truthful information, it punished the disclosure of information particularly
relevant to the democratic process of self-government. Treating the
Press Clause as merely protecting certain actors in the press process,
rather than as protecting the flow of information through society, led the
Court in Cohen to a decision that penalized the public interest and democratic politics.
Employing the functional approach in Cohen would have meant the
adoption of Justice Blackmun's dissenting position. Justice Blackmun
urged an approach that would view the dispute through an examination
of whether granting the plaintiff's relief would adversely affect the quantity and quality of speech entering the marketplace of ideas. Justice
Blackmun supported an approach that would focus on the speech itself
rather than on the identity of the speaker. 7 Thus, he rejected an interest-group approach to the First Amendment.
The majority, on the other hand, questioned only whether the First
Amendment gives a press entity a special right to disregard contracts.
The Court wholly disregarded the special role and function of the press
in democratic society-a role constitutionally conferred. Clearly, a news
entity has no right to violate contracts involving real estate or employee
salaries; but contracts involving news publishing must be measured
against the First Amendment dictates. Indeed, if the purpose of the First
Amendment Press Clause is to create a democratic press and an open
exchange of truthful ideas that will help a society govern itself, the holding in Cohen frustrated this purpose.
69. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 184-85 (1979).
70. Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 111 S. Ct. 2513, 2520 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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IV

The Negative Influence of the Interest-Group View in
Cohen
The majority in Cohen denied the press the power to print truthful
information about a political campaign-the protection of which lies at
the heart of the First Amendment. As argued by the dissent, the majority decided the First Amendment issues without ever accounting for the
importance of the particular information to public discourse. 7 Contrary
to an interest-group approach, the dissent reasoned that "freedom of the
press is ultimately founded on the value of enhancing such discourse for
the sake of a citizenry better informed and thus more prudently self-governed."72 Under this view, the Press Clause goes beyond protecting the
rights of press participants and seeks to protect the free flow of truthful
information through society-information necessary for the conduct of
democracy. As recognized by the dissent, there was "no doubt that the
fact of Cohen's identity expanded the universe of information relevant to
the choice faced by Minnesota voters in that State's 1982 gubernatorial
election, the publication of which was thus of73the sort quintessentially
subject to strict First Amendment protection.

According to the implications of the dissent in Cohen, the Press
Clause protects the flow of information through democratic society. It
does not give special rights and protections to "press actors" as argued
by the majority, but does give special protection to the flow of information vital to the maintenance of self-government. Thus, the press should
receive constitutional protection only when it serves the purpose of the
First Amendment. In Cohen, the press was serving such a purpose by
publishing the identity of the informant.
The interest-group approach in Cohen also jeopardized the integrity
of the communications marketplace. The implications of Cohen indicate
a potential shift in power to suppliers of information and away from the
distributors of information-a shift that poses a significant chilling or
censoring effect. By giving informants greater power to place ideas into
the communications marketplace while also masking their identity, the
Court inhibits the public's ability to determine truth. This inhibition is a
direct contradiction of the role of the press in a democratic society. The
Cohen decision also implies that informants may retain control over the
information they wish to place in the communications marketplace.
Members of the press must either abide by those controls or must not
71. Id. at 2523 (Souter, J., dissenting).
72. Id.
73. Id.
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print the information. Either way, the public loses and the social quest
for truth goes unfulfilled.
The Cohen decision consequently leaves the press in a vulnerable
position relative to its sources. There is no doubt that the press depends
greatly on sources or informants for much of the news it publishes. Yet
in the wake of Cohen, the press faces legal repercussions from two sides.
If it publishes a story unfavorable toward a subject, it faces a potential
libel suit. If it publishes a story distasteful to its source, it faces a possible
Cohen-type lawsuit alleging that the story violated the conditions specified by the source. The possibilities of such lawsuits pose stifling uncertainties for the press. How will the press know when an informant will
claim that a story is not reported the way the informant demanded it be
reported? How will the press know when an informant will claim after
publication that an agreement was previously reached regarding what
information could or could not be published? Since such a lawsuit
might come down to the word of the press against the word of the informant, the press is left with a much less certain and objective defense
than it has in the area of libel, where the plaintiff must prove objective
facts such as falsity and press misbehavior.
The ruling in Cohen also ignores the changing realities in the press
industry. In reaching its decision, the Court examined the applicability
of the First Amendment by focusing on the rights of the current participants in the news media. However, in any First Amendment dispute, the
identity of the actors or participants will continually change. This will
particularly be the case as the press and communications industries
change with the emerging electronic and telecommunications technologies. Thus, a reliance in First Amendment adjudication on the rights of
existing interest groups ignores new and emerging participants in the
communications and press fields. Therefore, a lasting and consistent
First Amendment approach can be formed only through a focus on the
role and function of the press rather than on the particular participants.
While media groups will continually change, the functions of a free press
in democratic society will not. A First Amendment doctrine evolved
from an interest-group adjudication would quickly become obsolete as
the press industry changes over time.
V
The Public Dimension of News and the Implications
for Confidential Sources
Contrary to the result in Cohen, First Amendment disputes should
be resolved by examining whether there exists any restriction on speech
entering the marketplace of ideas. It is not the particular press entity

HASTINGS COMM/ENT

L.J.

[Vol. 14:403

that receives special privilege under the First Amendment, it is the flow
of information. The focus of judicial attention in Free Press Clause cases
should be the information, not the groups involved.
Under the functional view, the press forms a kind of public forum,
and the news under the control of the press attains a public dimension.
The Court's treatment of the Cohen case simply as a contract case takes
an unreasonably narrow view of the press and of news, seeing the former
as merely a private buyer and seller of news and the latter as no different
from any other commodity which can be privately transacted. Yet news
possesses a public dimension and value. Without the free exchange of
information, education becomes a fruitless task and self-government becomes unattainable.
This public aspect of news sets newspapers apart from other private
businesses and is what prompted the framers to confer constitutional
protection on the press. Because of its unique and constitutional role, the
press in investigating and reporting the news has an obligation to treat
that news as a kind of public commodity. When, for instance, the press
acquires information from a confidential informant regarding a crime
that has been committed, a public uproar would surely ensue if the press
withheld the identity of that informant because it had given a promise of
confidentiality to the informant. We expect the press to treat the news in
the public's interest, not in the interests of itself or of its sources. The
First Amendment, in this regard, should direct the press to serve the
public's interest when public and private interests collide.
The public dimension of news, however, has important implications
for the use by the press of confidential sources in its reporting of the
news. Under the functional view of the Press Clause, the emphasis is on
getting the information into the communications marketplace so that the
public can debate and determine its truth. In both the cultural practices
and judicial processes in America, the credibility of the source is vitally
important in determining truth. We rely as much on the source as on the
nature and content of the information. Therefore, given this function of
the press and the public utility aspect of news, the press' practice of freely
using confidential sources becomes somewhat suspect. Such confidentiality may adversely affect the goals of truth, democratic dialogue, and selfgovernment contained in the First Amendment.
The press has already begun to recognize the difficulties and
problems with their use of confidential sources. For instance, in the
wake of Cohen, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune published a set of
guidelines to be followed by reporters when dealing with such infor-
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mants.7 4 Furthermore, since the 1980 Janet Cooke controversy, newspapers seem to be cutting back on their use of confidential sources. In that
controversy, Cooke, a Washington Post reporter, won a Pulitzer Prize for
what turned out to have been a fabricated story about a young heroin
addict-a story claimed by Cooke to have been provided by a confidential source. Indeed, the use of confidential sources may not only contradict the constitutional functions of the press, it also may not fit with the
historical practices of the American press.
The use of confidential sources in reporting investigative stories is a
relatively new practice. For much of its formative period, during the
revolutionary and constitutional eras, the press often printed essays and
editorials by individuals who wrote under a pseudonym.75 Those writers
sought to conceal their identities when writing about controversial topics
such as the movement for independence. The contributions, however,
were clearly opinion essays, and they were printed by an editor who
sometimes did not know the identity of the author.7 6 Indeed, during the
constitutional period, the pivotal role in gathering information and opinions was held not by the printer but by his contributors and information
sources. Most essays were written by contributors rather than the editors.77 If a source were printed under a pseudonym, the public still obtained all the information possessed by the printer.
After the Revolutionary War and the adoption of the Constitution,
the publication of anonymous essays in newspapers declined in frequency. During the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, confidential sources were not widely used in any fashion by the press. With the
rise of investigative journalism in the latter part of the twentieth century,
however, the reliance on confidential sources greatly increased, and the
use of such sources differed markedly from the colonial practice regarding anonymous contributors. 78 During the reporting on Watergate, for
instance, the press obtained and published information from sources
74. MINNEAPOLIS STAR AND TRIBUNE, Aug. 11, 1988, at A10. Those guidelines addressed three primary issues: 1) that frequent reliance on anonymous sources increases the risk

of unfair or inaccurate journalism and can hurt the paper's credibility; 2) that information
from anonymous sources should be published only when necessary to provide important information, and only after both reporter and editor are satisfied that standards of fairness and
accuracy have been met; 3) that the paper will avoid offering sources promises of confidentiality that are not in the newspaper's or readers's best interest; but once made, such promises may
be broken by the paper in extraordinary circumstances.
75. ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, PRELUDE TO INDEPENDENCE 61 (1958).
76. See Robert M. Weir, The Role of the Newspaper Press in the Southern Colonies on the
Eve of the Revolution, THE PRESS AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 32 (Bernard Bailyn et
al. eds., 1980).
77.

DONALD H.

(1969).
78. Id.
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whose identities were notrevealed. Contrary to its colonial predecessors,
the modem press actively sought out and published particular factual
information and then, if it chose not to reveal the source, ascribed the
facts to a confidential informant. 79 Although the use of confidential
sources helped the press do battle with the targets of its investigations,
the question left unanswered was whether the public would somehow
arrive at the truth from this combat.8 0 Without the ability to scrutinize
the source or to investigate its knowledge, the public cannot fully determine the credibility of the information. This inability undermines the
values of the First Amendment since truth can be determined not just
through the content of the information but through the identity and
credibility of the source.
VI
Conclusion
The Cohen opinion and its implication for First Amendment values
suggest that courts must adopt a new view of the First Amendment
which supports a healthy flow of information in a democracy. Under a
functional view of the First Amendment, the Press Clause protects the
process of communication through the press. This view strives to uphold
the integrity of what Justice Holmes called "the marketplace of ideas"'"
and to protect the maintenance of conditions necessary for the press to
perform its function of promoting the dissemination of truth and open
democratic dialogue. To perform these constitutional functions, the information passing through it must be open and uncensored, and informants should not be allowed to place in the stream of communication
only that information they wish published. Thus, as guardians of the
marketplace of ideas, the press should be free of restrictions on the publi79. In their Watergate investigation, Carl Bernstein and Bob Woodward frequently used a
source known only as "Deep Throat." See generally, CARL BERNSTEIN & BOB WOODWARD,
ALL THE PRESIDENT'S MEN

(1974).

80. Perhaps not surprisingly, the fourth estate model developed in the wake of the shift
toward adversary, investigative journalism that took place in the 1960s. This shift intensified
during the Vietnam conflict and the Watergate scandal. During that time, the press became
deeply antagonistic and combative. See BENNO C. SCHMIDT, JR., FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

VERSUS PUBLIC ACCESS 58-59 (1976). According to Schmidt, the Vietnam War was critical in
changing the attitude of journalists toward their government, and the growth of radical and
countercultural movements led to an adversarial role between press and government. As the
press reported about activities of civil disobedience by these groups in the 1960s, law enforce-

ment officials found journalists with information about militant groups to be tempting sources
of information. The ensuing wave of subpoenas and investigations left journalists with the
perception that government wished to cut off their flow of information. Id. For a further

discussion of the press's role during the Vietnam conflict, see KATHLEEN J. TURNER, LYNDON
JOHNSON'S DUAL WAR: VIETNAM AND THE PRESS (1985).
81. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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cation of truthful information. Yet, in recognizing this role and obligation, the press must also accept its duty to open itself up to a fuller and
more diverse democratic dialogue. Its duties to the public and the democratic process may also mean that the use of confidential sources in the
reporting of investigative stories should be carefully reviewed.

